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RETALIATORY EVICTION AS ABUSE
OF RIGHTS: A CIVILIAN APPROACH
TO LANDLORD-TENANT DISPUTES
George M. Armstrong, Jr. * &
John C. LaMaster**
L Introduction
Soon after Charlie Barnes moved into her New Orleans apartment,
she began experiencing problems with the premises, including flooding,
rodent infestation, inadequate electrical outlets, and defective doors,
floors, and ceilings. After the lessor's agent, Real Estate Services, Inc.
(RESI), failed to make the necessary repairs, Barnes consulted an at-
torney. The attorney sent a certified letter to RESI on September 23,
1983, specifying the defects and warning that Barnes would exercise her
right under Louisiana Civil Code article 2694 to repair and deduct the
cost from her rent, unless RESI made all repairs. One week later, RESI
served Barnes with a notice to vacate, and subsequently filed a rule for
possession.
In the city court, Barnes argued that the eviction was in retaliation
for her attorney's letter, and that such a retaliatory eviction was an
abuse of the landlord's right to evict. RESI's supervisor stated that the
eviction was necessary in order for the landlord to repair the serious
defects in the premises. As proof of the severity of these defects, RESI
offered testimony that the electrical system was falling off the exterior
of the building and introduced correspondence from the city threatening
condemnation of the property. The trial judge ordered Barnes to vacate
the premises. He rejected her defense of retaliatory eviction because the
landlord had legitimate reasons for eviction.'
On appeal to the fourth circuit, Barnes again urged the defense of
retaliatory eviction. After discussing the elements of the abuse of rights
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theory, 2 the court held that Barnes' defense was unfounded. The court
found that the serious defects in the apartment were valid grounds for
the eviction, and that the simultaneous eviction of a neighboring tenant
evidenced a lack of retaliatory motive. Due to potential safety concerns,
Barnes was not permitted to remain in the apartment while the repairs
were effectuated.'
Although Charlie Barnes' retaliatory eviction defense was not suc-
cessful, her case is important for two- reasons. First, it demonstrates
the willingness of Louisiana courts to hear the defense of retaliatory
eviction under the abuse of rights doctrine, even in a summary pro-
ceeding. 4 Second, the case illustrates the context in which a defense of
retaliatory eviction is desirable.
The Louisiana Civil Code governs the lease relationship by appor-
tioning rights and obligations between the landlord and the tenant.5 A
notice to vacate may be considered retaliatory if it is in response to
the tenant's efforts to enforce one of his rights or if it is in response
to the tenant's efforts to force the landlord to meet his obligations. For
example, Charlie Barnes was attempting to enforce her right to repair
and deduct. 6 Other rights of the tenant which are enforceable against
the landlord include the right to demand that the landlord make certain
repairs,7 the right to sublease,8 and the right to peaceable possession
free from disturbances by third parties claiming a right to the premises.9
An important set of tenants' rights also exists outside the Civil
Code. Each major city in Louisiana has either a set of Housing Standards
or a Minimum Housing Standards Code.'0 These codes were enacted to
prevent the use of "residential buildings and dwelling units characterized
by physical conditions which render them unfit and unsafe for human
habitation."' The strong public policy underlying these housing codes
is "to protect the health, safety and welfare of the general public and
2. Real Estate Services, Inc. v. Barnes, 451 So. 2d 1229 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984).
3. Id.
4. For a discussion of current eviction practice in Louisiana, see infra text accom-
panying notes 31-55.
5. La. Civ. Code arts. 2676-2744.
6. La. Civ. Code art. 2694.
7. La. Civ. Code arts. 2692, 2693 and 2717; see also, Armstrong and LaMaster,
The Implied Warranty of Habitability; Louisiana Institution, Common Law Innovation,
46 La. L. Rev. 195 (1985).
8. La. Civ. Code art. 2725.
9. La. Civ. Code art. 2704.
10. E.g., New Orleans, La., Minimum Housing Standards Code ch. 30 (1956); Shreve-
port, La., Code of Ordinances ch. 19 (1971); Baton Rouge, La., Code of Ordinances
Title 8A (1983) (adopting Standard Housing Code, 1976 edition, as revised in 1977 and
1978, by reference).
11. New Orleans, La., Minimum Housing Standards Code ch. 30, art. I, § 1 (1956).
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the owners and occupants of dwellings and dwelling units used or
intended to be used for purposes of human habitation."'' 2 In order to
implement this policy, very specific standards are applicable to all aspects
12. New Orleans, La., Minimum Housing Standards Code ch. 30, art. 1, § 2 (1956).
The strength of this public policy is evidenced by the extensive statements of "policy"
and "legislative findings of fact" included in the ordinances. For example, New Orleans,
La., Minimum Housing Standards Code ch. 30, art. 1, § 2 (1956) states:
It is found and declared that there exist in the City and Parish of New Orleans
certain substandard and unsanitary residential buildings and dwelling units char-
acterized by physical conditions which render them unfit and unsafe for human
habitation. These conditions are of such nature as to be detrimental to the
health, safety and welfare of the occupants thereof as well as the public at
large.
It is further found and declared that there exist in the City and Parish of New
Orleans residential buildings and dwellings units which were originally constructed
according to standards now recognized to be obsolete and deficient in terms of
current modern housing standards governing construction, use, occupancy, light,
ventilation and sanitary facilities. The continued existence of these obsolete and
deficient residential buildings and dwelling units is detrimental to the health,
safety and welfare of the occupants thereof as well as the public at large.
It is further found that the existence of such substandard, unsanitary, obsolete
and deficient buildings used for dwelling purposes, threatens the physical, social
and economic stability of the surrounding residential buildings and neighborhood
facilities, occasions disproportionate expenditure of public funds for remedial
action and jeopardizes the well-being of the entire community.
Therefore, it is in the public interest of the citizens of New Orleans to protect
and promote decent, safe and sanitary residential buildings and dwelling units
by the adoption and enforcement of the minimum housing standards of this
chapter.
The adoption and enforcement of this Minimum Housing Standards Code is
hereby declared to be a necessary municipal governmental function in the interest
of the health, safety and welfare of the people of the City of New Orleans.
Shreveport's Code similarly provides:
There exists in the City of Shreveport, Louisiana, structures used for human
habitation and nonresidential purposes that are substandard in structure and
maintenance. Furthermore, inadequate provisions for light and air, insufficient
protection against fire, lack of proper heating, unsanitary conditions, and ov-
ercrowding constitute a menace to the health, safety, morals, welfare, and
reasonable comfort of our citizens. The existence of such conditions will create
slum and blighted areas requiring large scale clearance if not remedied. Fur-
thermore, in the absence of corrective measures, such areas will experience a
deterioration of social values, a curtailment of investment and tax revenue, and
an impairment of economic values. The establishment and maintenance of min-
imum structural and environmental standards are essential to the prevention of
blight and decay and the safeguarding of public health, safety, morals, and
welfare. Therefore, the City of Shreveport, acting through the city council as
its governing body, has adopted, by way of ordinance at its regular meeting
convened, this code which is authorized by Louisiana Revised Statutes, Title
33, Sections 4751 and 4752.
Shreveport, La., Code of Ordinances ch. 19, art. 1, § I (1971).
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of housing including plumbing, 3 sanitation,1 4 water supply, 3 heating, 6
interior 7 and exterior walls, 8 light and ventilation, 9 porches, 0 railings, 2'
doors, windows, and screens. 2
The effectiveness of a housing code's administrative remedies, which
may include fines2 or even demolition of the building when standards
are not met, 24 may depend upon the willingness and ability of tenants
to report violations. For example, the Shreveport Housing and Property
Standards Code authorizes the administrator to inspect a building only
after receiving a complaint by an occupant of a building or a petition
signed by at least five citizens, each of whom reside within six hundred
feet of the premises complained of, alleging that the premises are in
violation of the code.
25
13. E.g., New Orleans, La., Minimum Housing Standards Code ch. 30, art Ill, §
34 and art. VI, § 55 (1956); Standard Housing Code § 302.2 (1982).
14. E.g., New Orleans, La., Minimum Housing Standards Code ch. 30, art. VI, §
52 (1956); Shreveport, La., Code of Ordinances ch. 19, art. IV, §§ 71, 76 (1971); Standard
Housing Code § 307 (1982).
15. E.g., Shreveport, La., Code of Ordinances ch. 19, art. IV, § 71.3 (1971); Standard
Housing Code § 302.3 (1982).
16. E.g., New Orleans, La., Minimum Housing Standards Code ch. 30, art. 111, §§
34, 38, 42, and art. VI, § 57 (1956); Shreveport, La., Code of Ordinances ch. 19, art.
IV, § 71.5 (1971).
17. E.g., New Orleans, La., Minimum Housing Standards Code ch. 30, art. III, §
30, and ch. 29, art. XI, §§ 91-100 (1952) (special provisions for lead based substances);
Shreveport, La., Code of Ordinances ch. 19, art. IV, § 74.16 (1971); Standard Housing
Code § 305.16 (1982).
18. E.g., New Orleans, La., Minimum Housing Standards Code ch. 30, art. IIl, §
25 (1956); Shreveport, La., Code of Ordinances ch. 19, art. IV, § 74.2 (1971); Standard
Housing Code § 305.2 (1982).
19. E.g., New Orleans, La., Minimum Housing Standards Code ch. 30, art. III, §§
39-41 (1956); Shreveport, La., Code of Ordinances ch. 19, art. IV, § 72 (1971); Standard
Housing Code § 303 (1982).
20. E.g., New Orleans, La., Minimum Housing Standards Code ch. 30, art. 111, §
27, and art. VI, § 62 (1956); Shreveport, La., Code of Ordinances ch. 19, art. IV, §
74.5 (1971); Standard Housing Code § 305.5 (1982).
21. E.g., New Orleans, La., Minimum Housing Standards Code ch. 30, art. Ill, §
27 (1956); Shreveport, La., Code of Ordinances ch. 19, art. IV, §§ 74.6, 74.18 (1971);
Standard Housing Code §§ 305.6, 305.18 (1982).
22. E.g., New Orleans, La,, Minimum Housing Standards Code ch. 30, art. I11, §
26, and art. VI, § 56 (1956); Shreveport, La., Code of Ordinances ch. 19, art, IV, §§
74.7, 74.13 (1971).
23. E.g., Shreveport, La., Code of Ordinances ch. 19, art, II, §§ 18.1-18.2 (1971)
(fine not to exceed $500.00).
24. E.g., Shreveport, La., Code of Ordinances ch. 19, art. 1, § 3(a) and art. III, §
44 (1971).
25. Shreveport, La., Code of Ordinances ch. 19, art. II, § 11.1 (1971); see also, New
Orleans, La., Minimum Housing Standards Code ch. 30, art. I, § 10 (1956).
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A tenant's complaint to the housing authorities may result in a fine
or other penalty being imposed upon the landlord. 26 Such an event may
incite the landlord to retaliate against the tenant.27 Under current Lou-
isiana eviction practice, a retaliation could take the form of a refusal
to renew a lease or the termination of a periodic lease. 28
A retaliatory eviction punishes a tenant for exercising his legitimate
rights. Additionally, such an eviction will have a chilling effect upon
other similarly situated tenants. This chilling effect frustrates the public
policies underlying the Civil Code and the local housing codes.2 9 This
article will review current eviction practices in Louisiana, examine re-
taliatory eviction legislation in other states, demonstrate that the adoption
of similar legislation by Louisiana would be consistent with the civilian
doctrine of abuse of rights, and recommend the adoption of specific
legislation. Such a recommendation is particularly timely since the
Louisiana State Law Institute is currently preparing to recommend re-
vision of the Civil Code articles on lease.
II. Eviction Procedure
A review of current eviction practice in Louisiana will demonstrate
how the landlord can use this procedure to effect a retaliatory purpose
and how the tenant may raise the defense of retaliatory eviction in an
action for possession. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 4701
allows a landlord to commence eviction proceedings when a tenant's
right to possession has ceased because of expiration of the lease term,
nonpayment of rent, or failure to perform other lease obligations.,, A
landlord may use this procedure to retaliate against the tenant by ter-
minating the lease upon the expiration of the periodic or stipulated lease
term.
A lease term may be set by contract between the parties or deter-
mined by supplemental provisions of law.12 In the case of a lease with
26. E.g., New Orleans, La., Minimum Housing Standards Code ch. 30, art. I, § 12,
and art. VII, §§ 63-71 (1956); Shreveport, La., Code of Ordinances ch. 19, art. II, §§
12, 16, 18.1-18.2 (1971).
27. See Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1016, 89 S. Ct. 618 (1969).
28. See infra discussion accompanying notes 31-55.
29. Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016,
89 S. Ct. 618 (1969).
30. Retaliatory eviction legislation has been before the Louisiana legislature on at
least one prior occasion. La. H.B. 709, ist Reg. Sess. (1975) was defeated. See Note,
Lessor's Obligation to Maintain a Habitable Dwelling: Enforcement By Lessee and Re-
taliatory Action By Lessor, 36 La. L. Rev. 813 (1976).
31. La. Code Civ. P. art. 4701.
32. La. Civ. Code arts. 2684, 2685, and 2687.
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a definite contractual term, Civil Code article 2727 provides that the
lease concludes automatically at the expiration of the agreed term33
without the need for either party to provide notice of termination.3 4
The conclusion of the lease term, however, does not end the tenant's
right to possession of the premises. Either party can terminate this right
to possess. The tenant may end his possession by abandonment of the
premises at the end of the term. The landlord, with or without retaliatory
motive, may end the possession by providing a notice of refusal to
renew or to allow reconduction.3 3
If the tenant does not quit the premises at the end of the term and
remains in possession for one week without objection from the landlord,
a periodic lease is established by tacit reconduction.3 6 A reconduction
of the lease occurs by operation of law, as it is presumed that the
continued possession by the tenant and the willing sufferance of this
possession by the landlord constitute a tacit agreement to extend the
lease on the same conditions.37 Reconduction extends an urban lease on
a periodic, month-to-month basis.3 A lease of residential property with-
out a stipulated term is also a periodic month-to-month lease.3 9 Either
party may terminate a periodic lease by notice ten days before the
expiration of the period.40
A landlord with a retaliatory purpose can thus "evict" his tenant
by refusing to renew a lease or by terminating a periodic lease. When
the landlord has terminated the tenant's right to possession by delivery
of a notice to vacate, or the tenant has expressly waived his right to
notice,'4 1 and the tenant has not vacated the premises, the landlord may
commence eviction proceedings. 42
The landlord must resort to judicial process because eviction through
self-help may constitute the tort of trespass43 or conversion." The land-
33. La. Civ. Code art. 2727.
34. 2 M. Planiol, Civil Law Treatise pt. 2, No. 1730 (La. St. L. Inst. trans. 11th
ed. 1959).
35. La. Civ. Code art. 2691; La. Code Civ. P. art. 4701; 2 M. Planiol, supra note
34, at No. 1732.
36. La. Civ. Code art. 2689; the rule for predial leases is different, see La. Civ.
Code art. 2688.
37. S. Litvinoff, Sale and Lease in the Louisiana Jurisprudence, at 561 (1983); 2 M.
Planiol, supra note 34, at No. 1732.
38. La. Civ. Code art. 2689; the rule for predial leases is provided by La. Civ. Code
art. 2688.
39. La. Civ. Code arts. 2685, 2687.
40. La. Civ. Code art. 2686; a different rule governs predial leases, see S. Litvinoff,
supra note 37, at 561.
41. Waiver is allowed by La. Code Civ. P. art. 4701 and La. Civ. Code art. 2713.
42. La. Civ. Code art. 2713; La. Code Civ. P. art. 4701.
43. See, e.g., Patin v. Stockstill, 315 So. 2d 868 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1975).
44. See, e.g., Porter v. Johnson, 369 So. 2d 1141 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 371 So. 2d 615 (La. 1979).
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lord may have the tenant cited by a court of competent jurisdiction
to show cause why he should not be ordered to deliver possession to
the landlord .4 Trial of the rule to show cause is a summary proceeding,4
intended to be conducted rapidly, without observance of all of the
formalities required in ordinary proceedings 7.4  A jury trial is not avail-
able, 48 and neither party may obtain damages.4 9 To prevail the landlord
need only prove the existence of a lease, and that the tenant is in breach
thereof or that a notice has been given to end the tenant's right of
possession.50
The tenant may raise a limited number of defenses." For example,
if the reason for eviction is the tenant's failure to pay rent, he may
offer as a defense his withholding of rent to make necessary repairs.5 2
A tenant may also challenge the propriety of the eviction. This should
allow him to raise a defense of retaliatory eviction because the essence
of that defense is that the landlord is using the process of the court
for an improper purpose."
If the tenant is found to have lost his right of possession, the court
will render a judgment of eviction ordering the tenant to vacate the
premises. 4 The tenant may suspend execution of the judgment by alleging
an error of law or fact in the trial of the rule and by complying with
the strict procedures for appeal."
The current procedure for eviction is an efficient process. Never-
theless, the procedure can only be considered fair if the tenant is entitled
to raise an affirmative defense of retaliatory eviction. A review of
retaliatory eviction legislation from other states will demonstrate the
parameters of the remedy.
45. La. Code Civ. P. art. 4731.
46. Id.; La. Code Civ. P. art. 2592(3).
47. La. Code Civ. P. art. 2591.
48. La. Code Civ. P. art. 1732.
49. Himbola Manor Apartments v. Watson, 315 So. 2d 790 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975).
50. Williams v. Reynolds, 448 So. 2d 845 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984).
51. La. Code Civ. P. art. 4732 provides that the court can hear "any defense."
However, the tenant may not inject defenses such as the invalidity of the landlord's title.
See Williams v. Reynolds, 448 So. 2d 845 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984), and Vicknair v.
Watson-Pitchford, Inc., 348 So. 2d 695 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1977).
52. See, e.g., Laurel Lee Shopping Center v. Parker, 457 So. 2d 822 (La. App. Ist
Cir. 1984); Evans v. Does, 283 So. 2d 804 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973); Leggio v. Manion,
172 So. 2d 748 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965); repair and deduct is allowed under La. Civ.
Code art. 2694.
53. La. Code Civ. P. art. 4732 allows the court to hear "any defense." While the
tenant is somewhat limited in the number of defenses he can raise, see supra note 51,
public policy in favor of decent housing should allow the raising of a retaliatory eviction
defense.
54. La. Code Civ. P. art. 4732.
55. La. Code Civ. P. art. 4735.
19861
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
III. The Experience of Other States
At common law a landlord had the right to decline to renew a lease
or to evict a month-to-month tenant for any reason or for no reason
at all.56 The first limitations on this principle occurred in the District
of Columbia. They were jurisprudential rather than statutory in origin.
Yvonne C. Edwards was a month-to-month tenant who found the
condition of her rental housing intolerable. 7 She reported violations of
statutes governing sanitary conditions to the appropriate authorities.
When her landlord brought an action to evict her, she asserted that the
notice to quit the premises was in retaliation for the lawful exercisc of
her rights.
The tenant relied principally on the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution, maintaining that eviction abridged her right to pe-
tition the government for redress of grievances. However, the trial judge
found that the tenant had failed to allege the requisite state action. The
mere existence of statutory eviction procedures did not implicate the
government in the landlord's action.
The trial judge relied instead on the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in the case of In re Quarles.8 There the Court had
recognized a constitutional right to report violations of the law and to
freedom from reprisal on account of the report. The citizen who reports
such violations is protected from retaliation by either public or private
parties. A court may not lend its authority to an eviction instituted in
retaliation for a citizen's constitutionally protected acts.
On appeal, Judge Skelly Wright upheld the result reached by the
trial court but declined to base the defense of retaliatory eviction in
constitutional law.5 9 Instead, he held that statutory construction and
public policy preclude the judiciary from assisting the landlord. Observing
that effective implementation and enforcement of housing codes depends
upon private initiative in reporting violations, Judge Wright found an
implicit legislative purpose to promote such complaints. This purpose
would be frustrated if a landlord could evict a tenant because the tenant
reported violations.
This decision left many questions unanswered. Was the landlord
only precluded from evicting the tenant or also from other forms of
reprisal? Are activities of the tenant other than reports to public au-
56. 2 R. Powell, The Law of Real Property 1 225 [21[b] (1985).
57. Habib v. Edwards, Civ. Div. No. LT75895 (D.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1965). This
memorandum opinion is reprinted fully in A. J. Casner & W. Barton Leach, Cases and
Text on Property at 523 (3d ed. 1984).
58. In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532, 15 S. Ct. 959 (1895).
59. Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016,
89 S. Ct. 618 (1969).
[Vol. 47
RETALIATORY EVICTION
thorities protected from retaliation? Must the tenant prove that the
landlord's acts are retaliatory or will the requisite intent be presumed?
If retaliatory intent is presumed, how long does the presumption endure?
Is retaliatory eviction merely a defense to the landlord's suit for pos-
session of the premises or an independent basis for an action to recover
actual or exemplary damages? Does the defense apply to all rental
housing or only to landlords who lease several residential premises?
Twenty-seven states have addressed these issues and now prohibit
retaliatory eviction by statute. 60 These statutes implement the policy first
articulated by Judge Wright of protecting "tenants who seek to exercise
their rights to decent, safe, and sanitary housing."' 6' Many have adopted
or been influenced by the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant
Act.
62
A majority of statutes define acts of retaliation to include increasing
the tenant's rent or decreasing services in addition to bringing or threat-
ening to bring an action for possession of the premises. 63 A few states
merely prohibit the landlord from evicting the tenant in reprisal. 64 The
legislation of some states is more expansive in its protection of the
tenant, prohibiting any type of retaliatory act. 65
60. Alaska Stat. § 34.03.310 (1962); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 33-1381 (1974); Cal.
Civ. Code § 1942.5 (West 1985); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 47a-20 (1978); Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 83.64 (West Supp. 1985); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 521-74 (Supp. 1984); Iowa Code Ann.
§ 562A.36 (West Supp. 1985); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 58-2572 (1983); Md. Real Prop. Code
Ann. § 8-208.1 (1981); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 186, § 18 (West 1981); Minn. Stat.
Ann. § 566.03 (West Supp. 1986); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 441.620 (1986); Mont. Code Ann.
§ 70-24-431 (1985); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-1439 (1981); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 118A.510 (1985);
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:42-10.10 (West Supp. 1985); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 47-8-39 (Supp.
1982); N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 223-b (Consol. 1979); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-37.1 (1984);
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5321.02 (Page 1981); Or. Rev. Stat. § 91.865 (1984); R.I. Gen.
Laws § 34-20-10 (1984); Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-28-514 (1982); Tex. Prop. Code Ann. §
92.057 (Vernon 1984); Va. Code § 55-248-39 (1986); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 59.18.240
(Supp. 1986); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 704.45 (West Supp. 1985).
61. See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-37.1 (1984).
62. Approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
in 1972, the Uniform Act has been adopted by Alaska, Arizona, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oregon, Tennessee and Virginia.
63. Alaska Stat. § 34.03.310 (1962); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 33-1381 (1974); Conn.
Gen. Stat. Ann. § 47a-20 (1978); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 83.64 (West Supp. 1985); Hawaii
Rev. Stat. § 521-74 (Supp. 1984); Iowa Code Ann. § 562A.36 (West Supp. 1985); Md.
Real Prop. Code Ann. § 8-208.1 (1981); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch 186, § 18 (West
1981); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 441.620 (1986); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 118A.510 (1985); N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 2A:42-10.10 (West Supp. 1985); N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 223-b (Consol. 1979);
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3521.02 (Page. 1981); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 704.45 (West Supp.
1985); URLTA (1972).
64. Cal. Civ. Code § 1942.5 (West 1985); Minn. Stat. Ann § 566.03 (West 1986);
N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 223-b (Consol. 1979); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-37.1 (1984); R.I.
Gen. Laws § 34-20-10 (1984); Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 92.057 (Vernon 1984).
65. New Jersey prohibits any substantial alteration of the terms of the tenancy. N.J.
19861
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
The legislation of these states generally protects the tenant's right
to report violations of building and housing codes to the appropriate
authorities. 66 They also protect the tenant who complains to the landlord
about the condition of the premises. 67 Complaints to authorities and the
landlord often must satisfy a requirement of good faith.68 Many statutes
also prohibit retaliation against a tenant who organizes or participates
in a tenant's union. 69
The catalogue of acts against which the landlord may not take
reprisals is extended in some jurisdictions. In California, for example,
the landlord may not retaliate after an inspection or issuance of a
citation by housing code enforcement authorities or after issuance of a
judgment on a question of tenantability which is adverse to the lan-
dlord. 70 Another group of states protect generally any good faith attempt
by the tenant to remedy by any lawful means a violation of the lease,
landlord and tenant law or the housing code. 7'
The most controversial aspect of the attempt to curtail reprisals
against tenants is the proof of a landlord's retaliatory intent. Unless
the landlord actually threatens the tenant, the evidence of intent usually
amounts to no more than the juxtaposition of a complaint of some
kind by the tenant followed by a notice of eviction or increase in rent.
The coincidence of these events may excite suspicion yet fail to prove
the landlord's retaliatory intent by a preponderance of the evidence.
The Uniform Act and many state legislatures73 have for this reason
Stat. Ann. § 2A:42-10.10 (West Supp. 1985). Washington's legislation affirms that the
list of prohibited retaliatory acts is merely illustrative. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 59.18.240
(Supp. 1986).
66. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 34.03.310 (1962); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 33-1381 (1974);
Cal. Civ. Code § 1942.5 (West 1985); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 47a-20 (1978); Hawaii
Rev. Stat. § 521-74 (Supp. 1984).
67. See, e.g., Iowa Civ. Code § 562A.36 (West Supp. 1985); Md. Real Prop. Code
Ann. § 8-208.1 (1981); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 441.620 (1986).
68. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 1942.5 (West 1985); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann § 47a-
20 (1978); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 521-4 (Supp. 1984).
69. See, e.g., Nev. Rev. Stat. § 118A.510 (1985); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:42-10.10
(West Supp. 1985); N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 223-b (Consol. 1979). Pennsylvania's statutory
protection against retaliatory eviction pertains only to a tenant who participates in a
tenant's union. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 68, § 250.205 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
70. Cal. Civ. Code § 1942.5(a) (3) & (4) (West 1985).
71. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 47a-20 (1978); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:42-10.10 (West
Supp. 1985); N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 223-b (Consol. 1979).
72. URLTA § 5.101(b) (1972).
73. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 33-1381 (1974); Cal. Civ. Code § 1942.5 (West 1985);
Iowa Code Ann. § 562A.36 (West Supp. 1985); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 186, § 18
(West 1981); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 441.620 (1986); Mont. Code Ann. § 70-24-431 (1985); N.J.
Stat. Ann. § 2A:42-10.10 (West Supp. 1985); N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 223-b (Consol.
1979); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 59.18.240 (Supp. 1986).
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established a presumption that a notice of eviction, refusal to renew a
lease or an increase in rent which follows soon after an act by the
tenant to secure his rights is retaliatory. In Massachusetts the effect of
this presumption is to require the landlord to prove by clear and con-
vincing evidence that any notice of termination or increase in rent is
not a reprisal.74 In other states the trier of fact is merely required to
find that the landlord's act was retaliatory unless evidence is introduced
to rebut the presumption." The landlord may introduce evidence of any
non-retaliatory motive for his actions.
76
This controversial presumption is not accepted in all states. Several
states which adopted the Uniform Act. deleted its reference to the pre-
sumption. 77 The effect of this deletion is unclear. The trier of fact may
infer a connection between the tenant's complaint and the landlord's
act even in the absence of a presumption. The tenant's burden in these
states is less than in those which require affirmative proof of retaliatory
intent. Five states impose the burden of proving retaliatory intent on
the tenant. 78 Moreover, some jurisdictions which employ a presumption
of retaliatory intent provide that the burden of proving retaliation is
the tenant's if the notice of intent to increase the rent, to evict or to
otherwise alter the terms of the lease is delivered before the tenant
complains about the premises. 79
The structure of the retaliatory eviction legislation creates the impres-
sion that there is a presumption that the landlord's acts are in reprisal
for the tenant's exercise of his rights even if the presumption is not
expressly established. Legislation in Alaska, which is typical of a number
of states, provides that the landlord may not retaliate by increasing the
rent or bringing an action for possession after the tenant has acted in
specified ways to protect her rights, but that the landlord may bring
an action for possession on account of any one of seven specific,
legitimate reasons. 80 It is submitted that a presumption of retaliatory
74. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 186, § 18 (West 1981).
75. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 33-1381 (1974); URLTA (1972).
76. N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 223-b(5) (Consol. 1979); Silberg v. Lipscomb, 117 N.J.
Super. 491, 285 A.2d 86 (1971).
77. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 58-2572 (1983); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-1439 (1981); N.M. Stat.
Ann. § 47-8-39 (Supp. 1982); Or. Rev. Stat. § 91.865 (1984); Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-28-
514 (1982).
78. Fla. Stit. Ann. § 83.64 (West Supp. 1985); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 566.03 (West
Supp. 1985); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-37.1 (1984); R.I. Gen. Laws § 34-20-10 (1984); Va.
Code § 55-248-39 (1986). All of these statutes require affirmatively that the tenant prove
.retaliatory intent by a preponderance of the evidence.
79. Iowa Code Ann. § 562A.36 (West Supp. 1985); URLTA (1972). In Washington,
a tenant's complaint to housing authorities within ninety days of notice of a proposed
rent increase is presumed to be in bad faith. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 59.18.240 (Supp.
1986).
80. Alaska Stat. § 34.03.310 (1962) (see infra note 83).
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motive follows implicitly from evidence of the tenant's complaint to
housing authorities if the statute lists legitimate, non-retaliatory grounds
for eviction. Superior legislative drafting would make this presumption
explicit and remove uncertainty concerning appropriate jury instructions.
All legislation under consideration permits the landlord to evict the
tenant or increase rent in some circumstances notwithstanding the ten-
ant's prior complaint to housing authorities. In some cases the landlord
is merely required to provide a credible explanation of any non-retaliatory
motive."s Other acts contain a brief list of permissible purposes for
landlord action, most of which relate to the particular tenant. For
example, Tennessee permits the landlord to bring an action for possession
despite the tenant's prior complaint if (a) the violation of the housing
code was caused by the tenant's lack of ordinary care, (b) the tenant
was in default in rent, or (c) compliance with the housing code would
require demolition or substantial alterations which would effectively
deprive the tenant of the use of the premises.8 2 The statutes of other
jurisdictions list numerous commercially justifiable grounds for bringing
an action for possession.83
Legislation such as that of Tennessee, which sharply limits permis-
sible grounds for eviction, exceeds the proper vocation of a retaliatory
eviction statute by precluding the landlord from terminating the lease
on other, justifiable grounds. Any legislative specification of permissible
81. N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 223-b (Consol. 1979).
82. Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-28-514 (1982).
83. Alaska Stat. § 34.03.310 (c) (1962):
(c) Notwithstanding (a) and (b) of this section, a landlord may bring an action
for possession if
(1) the tenant is in default in rent;
(2) compliance with the applicable building or housing code requires alter-
ation, remodeling, or demolition which would effectively deprive the tenant of
use of the dwelling unit;
(3) the tenant is committing waste, or a nuisance, or is using the dwelling
unit for an illegal purpose or for other than living or dwelling purposes in
violation of the rental agreement;
(4) the landlord seeks in good faith to recover possession of the dwelling
unit for personal purposes;
(5) the landlord seeks in good faith to recover possession of the dwelling
unit for the purpose of substantially altering, remodeling, or demolishing the
premises;
(6) the landlord seeks in good faith to recover possession of the dwelling
unit for the purpose of immediately terminating for at least six months use of
the dwelling unit as a dwelling unit; or
(7) the landlord has in good faith contracted to sell the property, and the
contract of sale contains a representation by the purchaser corresponding to (4),
(5) or (6) of this subsection.
Nevada permits an increase in rent which applies uniformly to all tenants. Nev. Rev.
Stat. § 118A.510 (1985).
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grounds for termination of the lease or increase in rent should focus
on the purpose of retaliatory eviction legislation. That purpose is to
encourage tenants to protect their right to a habitable dwelling, not to
give the tenant a right to remain in the premises indefinitely without
increased rent. If the goals of the legislature are to obtain rent stabi-
lization and create rights in tenants to renew leases indefinitely, these
purposes should be pursued directly and explicitly through other legis-
lation. Moreover, all justifiable commercial reasons for refusing to renew
a lease or increasing rent cannot possibly be listed in a statute. It is
therefore not necessary for legislation to state that the landlord may
increase the rent if his costs rise. It is enough to specify that the landlord
may rebut the presumption of retaliatory motive by proving by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the decision to bring an action for
possession, to increase rent or ,to decrease services was independent of
any consideration of the activities of the tenant protected by statute.
The doctrine of retaliatory eviction originated as a defense to the
landlord's suit for possession.8 4 Legislation has broadened the scope of
the doctrine, permitting an aggrieved tenant to recover possession, 85
actual damages, 86 and attorney's fees.8 7 Some statutes permit the recovery
of exemplary damages8 which may be a multiple of the monthly rent.8 9
In the Louisiana experience an award of exemplary damages is
exceptional. 90 On the other hand, the small amount of actual damages
involved in a suit for possession discourages litigation to vindicate the
tenant's rights. If the policy of our state is the protection of tenants
who in good faith invoke their legal right to a habitable dwelling, then
84. Edwards v. Habib 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016,
89 S. Ct. 618 (1969).
85. Alaska Stat. § 34.03.310 (1962); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 33-1381 (1974); Nev.
Rev. Stat. § 118A.510 (1985); URLTA (1972).
86. Cal. Civ. Code § 1942.5 (West 1985); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 118A.510 (1985); N.J.
Stat. Ann. § 2A:42-10.10 (West Supp. 1985); N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 223-b (Consol.
1979); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5321.02 (Page 1981).
87. Cal. Civ. Code § 1942.5 (West 1985); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 521-74 (Supp. 1984);
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5321.02 (Page 1981); Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 92.057 (Vernon
1984); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 59.18.240 (Supp. 1986).
88. California permits recovery of not more than $1000.00 nor less than $100.00 for
each retaliatory act where the landlord has been found guilty of fraud, oppression or
malice. Cal. Civ. Code § 1942.5 (West 1985).
89. Kansas Stat. Ann. § 58-2563 (1983) (the tenant may recover an amount not more
than one and one-half months' rent or actual damages, whichever is greater); Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 76-1430 (1981) (the tenant may recover an amount equal to three months periodic
rent as liquidated damages); Or. Rev. Stat. § 91.815 (1984) (damages in an amount not
more than two month's periodic rent or twice the actual damages sustained by the tenant,
whichever is greater); Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 92.057 (Vernon 1984) (one month rent
plus $100.00).
90. La. Civ. Code art. 2315.1.
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the legislature should provide incentives to the legal profession and the
litigant. The provisions of the Civil Code Ancillaries pertaining to lessees'
security deposits which permit the recovery of actual damages or two
hundred dollars, whichever is greater, 9' and costs and attorney's fees, 92
provide an appropriafe analogy for remedies in this area. If, as the
authors of this article believe, the public policy protecting a tenant's
right to report violations of the housing code is more significant than
that protecting the recovery of a security deposit, then the encouragement
to vindicate those- rights should be correspondingly greater, perhaps
amounting to liquidated damages of twice the monthly rent, with costs
and attorney's fees in the court's discretion.
On the other hand, some lessors should be excluded from the scope
of any retaliatory eviction statute. Where the owner of rental housing
is one of the occupants of the dwelling, for instance, he has an interest
in domestic tranquility which balances a tenant's right to report violations
of the housing code with impunity. Legislation of other states recognizes
this interest, and excludes owner-occupied dwellings of less that four units. 9-
IV. Abuse of Rights
The prohibition against retaliatory eviction in common law states
arose as a result of public policy. The courts considered the tenant's
right to report violations of the housing code and defects in the prem-
ises more worthy of protection than the landlord's right to resume
possession of the dwelling. 94 Retaliatory eviction legislation marked a
significant departure from the traditional common law rights of the
lessor. Similar public policy considerations could also serve as a foun-
dation for Louisiana retaliatory eviction legislation. However, in con-
trast to the common law, such legislation will harmonize with the
Louisiana civilian tradition. The ancient95 and widely accepted 91 civilian
91. La. R.S. 9:3252 (1983).
92. La. R.S. 9:3253 (1983).
93. N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 223-b (Consol. 1979). New Jersey excludes owner-oc-
cupied dwellings with not more than two rental units. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:42-10.10
(West Supp. 1985).
94. See, e.g., Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1016, 89 S. Ct. 618 (1969).
95. The earliest statement of the doctrine has been accredited to Gaius: "male enim
nostro iure uti non debemus" (we should not exercise our rights wrongfully); Bolgir,
Abuse of Rights in France, Germany, and Switzerland: A Survey of a Recent Chapter
in Legal Doctrine, 35 La. L. Rev. 1015, 1017 n. 9 (1975).
96. The countries which recognize the doctrine include Argentina, the Canadian prov-
ince of Quebec, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, U.S.S.R., Spain
and Switzerland. See Bolgtr, supra note .95; Catala & Weir, Delict and Torts: A Study
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doctrine of abuse of rights can serve as the basis for retaliatory evic-
tion legislation. 9
Stated in general terms, the doctrine of abuse of rights provides
that "fault" in the delictual sense98 may be imposed upon a party
who has exercised a right in a manner that has caused injury to an-
other.99 Planiol criticized the doctrine as being misnamed, stating that
if a right is abused, its exercise is illicit, and therefore no right has
been exercised.10° This frequently discussed criticism'0' has not impeded
application of the doctrine. "Abuse of rights" has become an accepted
term of art which provides sufficient reference to the legal theory.102
Planiol's criticism does, however, demonstrate that the doctrine of abuse
of rights can only be applied to an act which the actor can claim is
the exercise of a right. 0
3
In the landlord and tenant context, the landlord generally has a
right to evict his tenants. He may exercise that right by declining to
renew a lease or by terminating a periodic lease upon proper notice. In
a case involving a lease for a specific term or a periodic lease by tacit
reconduction, analysis of the right to evict reveals two sources of reg-
ulation, which may be characterized as internal and external. The internal
source is derived from the lease contract between the landlord and
in Parallel (Part I), 38 Tul. L. Rev. 221 (1964); Brunner, Abuse of Rights in Dutch
Law, 37 La. L. Rev. 728 (1977); Mayrand, Abuse of Rights in France and Quebec, 34
La. L. Rev. 993 (1974); Sono & Fujioka, The Rule of the Abuse of Right Doctrine in
Japan, 35 La. L. Rev. 1037 (1975); F. Stone, Tort Doctrine § 260, in 12 Louisiana Civil
Law Treatise (1977).
97. The common law generally does not recognize the doctrine of abuse of rights.
Chapman v. Hanig, 3 Weekly L.R. 19 (C.A.) (1963), discussed in Catala & Weir, supra
note 96, at 257. See also, Cueto-Rua, Abuse of Rights, 35 La. L. Rev. 965, 967-971
(1975) (discussing rejection of doctrine of abuse of rights in common law jurisdictions).
Louisiana could alternatively base retaliatory eviction legislation upon existing codal
provisions such as La. Civ. Code art. 1983 which requires that contracts be performed
in good faith.
98. Lambert v. Maryland Casualty Co., 403 So. 2d 739, 755 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1981), aff'd, 418 So. 2d 553 (La. 1982); Hero Lands Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 310 So. 2d
93, 97 (La. 1975); Comment, Abuse of Rights in Louisiana, 7 Tul. L. Rev. 426, 434
(1933).
99. Lambert v. Maryland Casualty Co., 403 So. 2d 739, 755 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1981), aff'd, 418 So. 2d 553 (La. 1982); Note, Lessor's Obligation to Maintain a Habitable
Dwelling: Enforcement by Lessee and Retaliatory Action by Lessor, 36 La. L. Rev. 813
(1976); Cueto-Rua, supra note 97.
100. 2 M. Planiol, Civil Law Treatise pt. I, No. 871 (La. St. L. Inst. trans. I 1th ed.
1959).
101. Cueto-Rua, supra note 97, at 974; Comment, "At will" Franchise Terminations
and the Abuse of Rights Doctrine-The Maturation of Louisiana Law, 42 La. L. Rev.
210, 232 (1981); Comment, supra note 98, at 433; Mayrand, supra note 96, at 993.
102. Cueto-Rua, supra note 97, at 974-975.
103. 2 M. Planiol, supra note 100; Brunner, supra note 96, at 730.
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tenant.104 The right to evict would be abused from this standpoint by
an eviction for reasons not contemplated by the landlord and tenant.
The external source of regulation is that imposed by society under
statute.10 5 Regulation of this kind considers the tenant's right to decent
housing and to redress grievances, as well as the landlord's legitimate
interest in determining the destiny of the property. The Civil Code
articles on lease articulate these policies.3 6 From an external standpoint,
eviction is an abuse of right if it occurs for purposes not consistent
with the appropriate balance between these policies.
Retaliatory eviction can be seen as an abuse of right from either
the internal or external perspective. Nevertheless, in the lease context,
the analysis can be merged. The contract between the landlord and
tenant cannot anticipate and provide for a retaliatory eviction by the
landlord, as such a provision would be contra bonos mores. Rights of
the landlord and tenant under their contract are limited in that the
parties can only contract for eviction on legitimate grounds: their sub-
jective expectations under the contract regarding eviction cannot deviate
from objective societal expectations. As a result, whether there has been
an abuse of right from either an internal or external perspective can be
determined under an identical analysis.
Analyzing a claim of abuse of rights requires a careful balancing
of competing policies. 07 A broad definition of retaliatory or abusive
eviction may overly restrict the landlord's individual rights. For example,
the landlord must retain his rights to end a periodic lease for valid
purposes such as his need to reconstruct the building,108 or the tenant's
failure to pay rent.'" The tenant may not become so secure in his
possession of the premises that the landlord loses effective ownership.
Conversely, some limits are needed on the landlord's ability to evict a
104. This internal source of regulation was referred to as a "threshold question" in
Comment, supra note 101 at 230:
An important threshold question must be answered in the negative before the
abuse of rights doctrine should be involved: was the condition performed in
the manner probably intended by the parties? If so, the non-terminating party
has no grounds for complaint, because he has obtained the very thing for which
he bargained.
While this threshold inquiry is appropriate in cases involving franchise terminations, its
separation into a separate inquiry is not needed in a case of retaliatory eviction. See infra
text accompanying notes 106-07.
105. See supra text accompanying notes 31-55 (discussing current Louisiana landlord's
statutory right to evict).
106. La. Civ. Code arts. 2692, 2695, 2710, 2711, 2712, 2729.
107. Catala & Weir, supra note 96, at 227.
108. The need to reconstruct the premises was a valid reason for eviction in Real
Estate Services, Inc. v. Barnes, 451 So. 2d 1229 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984).
109. La. Civ. Code art. 2712.
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tenant who has acted in a socially desirable way by reporting a housing
code violation.
Professor Cueto-Rua's discussion of the French framework of the
doctrine of abuse of rights demonstrates that a flexible theory is needed
in order to walk this fine line between individual freedom and societal
goals of a collective nature."10 This analysis of French Law, as subse-
quently embraced by the Louisiana Supreme Court,"' provides that an
abuse of rights will be found in four instances:
(1) The exercise of a right with the intent to cause harm is an
abuse of that right." 2 This is the aspect of the abuse of rights doctrine
which the trial court and the fourth circuit seemed willing to apply to
Charlie Barnes' case, Real Estate Services, Inc. v. Barnes."3 In rejecting
the retaliatory eviction defense, the appellate court stated, "we cannot
say the landlord filed the rule for possession solely to harass defend-
ant."'"4 A court relying exclusively on this aspect of the abuse of rights
theory will focus upon the landlord's motive. As a result, the court
may overemphasize the individual rights of the landlord and tenant, and
not give full consideration to the important societal interests to be
protected by a ban on retaliatory eviction.
(2) A right is abused if it is exercised with no serious or legitimate
interest. '1
(3) Enforcement of a right has been denied, as an abuse of right,
when the exercise of the right is against moral rules, good faith and
elementary fairness. "16
(4) The final criteria was propounded by the French scholar, Louis
Josserand. An exercise of a right in a manner contrary to the purposes
for which the right was granted would be an abuse of that right."17
110. Cueto-Rua, supra note 97, at 984-1004.
Ill. Illinois Central Gulf R.R. Co. v. International Harvester Co., 368 So. 2d 1009,
1014 (La. 1979); Comment, supra note 101, at 237; see also, Real Estate Services, Inc.
v. Barnes, 451 So. 2d 1229 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984), and Housing Authority of City of
Abbeville v. Hebert, 387 So. 2d 693 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 394 So. 2d
275 (La. 1980).
112. Cueto-Rua, supra note 97, at 991.
113. 451 So. 2d 1229 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984).
114. Id. at 1231.
115. Cueto-Rua, supra note 97 at 995; Morse v. Jay Ray McDermott & Co., 344 So.
2d 1353, 1369 (La. 1977) (on rehearing) ("The exercise of a right without a legitimate
and serious interest, even where there is neither alleged nor proved an intent to harm,
constitutes an abuse of right which courts should not countenance."); Lambert v. Maryland
Casualty Co., 403 So. 2d 739 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981) (no abuse of rights because the
defendant corporation acted to protect its "legitimate and serious interests"), aff'd, 418
So. 2d 553 (La. 1982).
116. Cueto-Rua, supra note 97, at 996.
117. Id. at 1001; Bolgdx, supra note 95, at 1018; Mayrand, supra note 96, at 1000.
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Under this theory, rights are relative to one another." 8 If a person has
exercised a right within the ambit of its purpose, he will be protected
even though he may cause inconvenience to the rights of others." 9 But
if the person exercises a right in an abnormal manner, not within its
purpose, he will be at "fault" and subject to civil liability for resulting
damages. 20 To determine what constitutes fault, societal interests must
be weighed in the balancing of relative rights.''
Josserand's criteria provides the best foundation for enactment of
retaliatory eviction legislation in Louisiana. If a landlord exercises his
right to evict a tenant in a manner consistent with expectations of the
parties, or of society-i.e., for a legitimate purpose-he will be protected
even if he causes inconvenience to the evicted tenant. The landlord
misuses his right, however, if he evicts the tenant in retaliation for the
tenant exercising his legitimate rights, such as reporting housing code
violations. The landlord's right to evict is relatively less important than
the tenant's right to report housing code violations free of fear of
retaliation because of the societal interest in safe housing, 2" which can
only be furthered through a guarantee of impunity. Abuse of the right
to evict has occurred from both the internal and external perspective
because neither the parties nor society can countenance an eviction for
a retaliatory purpose.2 3 A legislative ban on retaliatory eviction is clearly
compatible with the civilian doctrine of abuse of rights.
2 4
118. Cueto-Rua, supra note 97, at 1001; Bolgdr, supra note 95, at 1018.
119. F. Stone, supra note 96, at § 261; Comment, supra note 98, at 434.
120. Mayrand, supra note 96, at 1000; Comment, supra note 98, at 434; a frequently
cited example from French law involves a dispute between neighboring landowners. Mr.
Clment-Bayard owned a field on which he kept a hangar for his zeppelins. The owner
of the field adjacent to the hangar erected a wooden structure topped with metal spikes
for the sole purpose of impeding the zeppelin operations. This was held to be an abuse
of rights. Affaire Clement-Bayard, August 3, 1915, Cour de cassation Requetes, S. 1920.1.300,
D.P. 1917.1.79, discussed in Bolggr, supra note 95, at 1021.
121. Bolgtr, supra note 95, at 1018; Comment, supra note 98, at 434.
122. See, e.g., Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert denied, 393
U.S. 1016, 89 S. Ct. 618 (1969).
123. See supra text accompanying notes 106-07.
124. French law has apparently codified a ban on retaliatory eviction as a type of
abuse of rights:
A law of September 1, 1948, restricts the landowner's right to recover pos-
session of the demised premises at the end of the tenancy. The tenant acquires
a legal right to remain in occupation of the premises unless the landlord finds
himself in a situation that justifies his recovery of possession. Even when recovery
of possession is justified, the judge will not allow the landlord to exercise this
right if it is invoked with the intention of doing harm to the tenant and not
in order to satisfy a legitimate interest.
Catala & Weir, supra note 96, at 226. The Louisiana courts have recognized the applicability




The authors propose amendment of Civil Code article 2713 to pro-
hibit termination of a lease in retaliation for a tenant's good faith
exercise of her rights. This proposed legislation is consistent with the
law of other civilian jurisdictions which prohibits the abuse of rights" 5
and with modern legislation which applies the doctrine specifically to
lessor-lessee relations. 2 6 This proposal also develops the notion, currently
contained in the Louisiana Civil Code, that contracts are to be performed
in good faith.' The proposed legislation creates an explicit presumption
that a lessor's acts are retaliatory in certain cases. We have not, however,
attempted to list permissible grounds for terminating or altering the
terms of a lease. Any termination of the lease by the lessor which is
not retaliatory, or in violation of the lease or applicable law, would be
permissible.
Inasmuch as the proposed legislation furthers the public policy of
promoting decent housing, we urge the adoption of mandatory liquidated
damages in the amount of not less than two months stipulated rent
where the lessee has already been dispossessed and an award of the
reasonable expenses of the lessee's legal action in any case in which the
tenant prevails. This provision would provide for an award of attorney's
fees even if the tenant's cause were undertaken by a free provider of
legal services. The proposed legislation also precludes the lessor from
demanding increased rent or diminishing services supplied by the lessor
in retaliation for the tenant's acts. This provision is necessary to prevent
a lessor from indirectly terminating the lease by increasing the lessee's
costs.
We propose that the following language be added to Louisiana Civil
Code article 2713:28
Co. v. International Harvester, 368 So. 2d 1009 (La. 1979); Real Estate Services, Inc. v.
Barnes, 451 So. 2d 1229 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984). No Louisiana tenant has yet presented
a successful case based on this doctrine.
125. Spanish Civ. Code art. 7.2 provides:
The law does not protect the abuse of right or the antisocial exercise of the
same. Every act or omission which by the intention of its author, its object or
by the circumstances in which it takes place exceeds the normal limits of the
exercise of a right, with harm to a third party, shall give rise to corresponding
indemnification and to the adoption of judicial or administrative measures to
enjoin the continuance of the abuse.
126. Spanish Law of Urban Leases art. 9 ("Judges shall reject claims which imply
manifest abuse or abnormal exercise of a right.")
127. La. Civ. Code art. 1983.
128. La. Civ. Code art. 2713 currently provides:
When the lessor has given notice to the lessee, in the manner directed by
law, to quit the property, and the lessee persists in remaining on it, or if the
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The lessor abuses the right to terminate a lease by reconduction
or other periodic lease, to decline to renew a lease, to demand
greater rent, or to diminish services provided by the lessor if
the exercise of the right is in retaliation for an act by the lessee
to enforce one of the rights of the lessee under the lease or
applicable law. In any proceeding by or against the lessee,
evidence of the exercise by the lessee of a right of the lessee
under the lease within one year of the alleged act of retaliation
creates a rebuttable presumption that the act by the lessor was
in retaliation.
The lessee may raise the retaliatory character of the lessor's
acts as a defense in any proceeding of eviction brought by the
lessor. A lessee who prevails may recover reasonable legal ex-
penses. A wrongfully dispossessed lessee may recover actual
damages not less than twice the monthly rental in an ordinary
proceeding.
The provisions of this article relating to retaliatory conduct
do not apply to an owner occupied dwelling which contains no
more than four rental units.
lessee has waived his right to such notice by written waiver contained in the
lease and has lost his right of occupancy for any reason, the lessor may have
him summoned before a judge or a justice of the peace, and condemned to
depart; and if three days after notice of the judgment he has not obeyed, the
judge or justice of the peace may order that he shall be expelled and that the
property shall be cleared by the sheriff or constable, at his expense.
The mode of proceeding in such cases is provided for by special laws.
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